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ABSTRACT
The share of equity issues in total new equity and debt issues is a strong predictor
of U.S. stock market returns between 1928 and 1997. In particular, firms issue
relatively more equity than debt just before periods of low market returns. The
equity share in new issues has stable predictive power in both halves of the sample
period and after controlling for other known predictors. We do not find support for
efficient market explanations of the results. Instead, the fact that the equity share
sometimes predicts significantly negative market returns suggests inefficiency and
that firms time the market component of their returns when issuing securities.
IN THEIR CLASSIC PROOF of the irrelevance of financing policy, Modigliani and
Miller ~1958! implicitly assume market efficiency. If the stock market is
inefficient, however, financing policy becomes relevant in obvious ways. When
equity prices are too high, existing shareholders benefit by issuing overval-
ued equity. When equity prices are too low, issuing debt is preferable.
Consistent with this timing hypothesis, firms issuing equity have poor
subsequent performance. Stigler ~1964!, Ritter ~1991!, Loughran and Ritter
~1995!, and Speiss and Aff leck-Graves ~1995! find low average returns after
both initial and seasoned offerings.1 These studies focus exclusively on is-
suer returns relative to some benchmark—the first term in the decomposi-
tion Ri 5 ~Ri 2 Rb! 1 Rb. The benchmark is typically the market portfolio or
* Baker is from Harvard University. Wurgler is from the Yale School of Management. We
would like to thank John Campbell, Paul Gompers, Jean Helwege, Owen Lamont, Tim Lough-
ran, Scott Mayfield, Tom McCraw, Jay Ritter, Bob Shiller, Jeremy Stein, René Stulz, seminar
participants at Harvard University, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Yale
School of Management, and especially Andrei Shleifer for helpful comments. We thank Leslie
Jeng, S.P. Kothari, Charles Lee, and CDA Weisenberger for providing data. The issues data
series transcribed from the Federal Reserve Bulletin are available on Wurgler’s home page,
currently http:00som.yale.edu0;jaw52. This study has been supported by the Division of Re-
search of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.
1 See also Friend and Herman ~1964!, Friend and Longstreet ~1967!, Weiss ~1989!, Peavy
~1990!, Jain and Kini ~1994!, Lerner ~1994!, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen ~1995!,
Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah ~1997!, Rajan and Servaes ~1996!, Loughran and Ritter ~1997!,
Loughran and Vijh ~1997!, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales ~1998!, Cornett, Mehran, and Tehra-
nian ~1998!, Teoh, Welch, and Wong ~1998a, 1998b!, and Ahn and Shivdasani ~1999! for other
empirical results that suggest managers time the equity market. However, some authors chal-
lenge the idea that firms successfully time the idiosyncratic portion of their returns ~Brav and
Gompers ~1997!, Brav, Geczy and Gompers ~2000!, Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli ~2000!!.
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LV, NO. 5 • OCT. 2000
2219
some other portfolio that moves with the market. But equity issues tend to
cluster around market peaks, as shown by Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist
~1994! and other studies of “hot issue markets.” This suggests that issuers
try to time both their idiosyncratic return and the market return. In this
paper, we consider the second possibility.
The empirical financing variable we focus on is the share of equity issues in
total equity and debt issues, calculated from data reported in the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin. In the typical year between 1927 and 1996, equity issues rep-
resent about 21 percent of the value of all new issues. This share increases right
after a year of high equity market returns. More interestingly, firms issue rel-
atively more equity just before years of low market returns. For example, when
the equity share in new issues is in the bottom historical quartile ~below 0.14!,
the average CRSP value-weighted market return in the next year is 14 per-
cent. When the equity share is in the top historical quartile ~above 0.27!, the
average return in the next year is 26 percent. The difference in equal-weighted
market returns is even larger, 27 percent versus 28 percent.
In terms of sheer univariate predictive power, the equity share in new
issues is a stronger predictor of one-year-ahead returns than the dividend-
to-price ratio or the book-to-market ratio. It is also statistically significant
and of stable magnitude in both the first and second half of the sample.
Scaled-price variables, by contrast, do not achieve this level of robustness.
Finally, the equity share adds incremental predictive power to the scaled-
price variables and other known predictors.
The main question is whether these results have an explanation consis-
tent with market efficiency. We consider three explanations. The first and
simplest one is that issuing more equity than debt reduces required equity
returns through a textbook Modigliani and Miller leverage effect. However,
a simple calculation shows that the size of the equity share coefficient is
over 20 times too large to be due to this effect alone. Because new issues
represent only a small fraction of outstanding capital, they do not inf luence
aggregate leverage enough to change expected equity returns.
A second potential explanation is that the equity share is related to future
returns through investment. We use a simple representative firm model based
on Stein ~1996! to understand how investment and financing decisions differ
in efficient versus inefficient capital markets. In the efficient market case,
if the rational discount rate falls, firms increase investment. If firms follow
a pecking-order financing policy, they will also tend to increase the equity
share in new issues at the same time they increase investment, giving rise
to our main result. However, in the data, aggregate investment is essentially
unrelated to subsequent aggregate returns. This conf licts with the efficient
market case of the model, which predicts a negative relationship. By con-
trast, when mispricing is the primary cause of predictable variation in re-
turns, the model illustrates how the equity share may respond to future
returns even when investment does not. The empirical analysis in this sec-
tion also indicates that the equity share in new equity and debt issues has
somewhat more power to predict market returns than the absolute level of
equity issues.
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A third potential explanation is that an unobserved factor such as market
risk may simultaneously change both optimal capital structure and required
returns in a way that induces a relationship between the equity share and
future returns. However, standard theories of optimal capital structure point
toward a positive, not negative, relationship between the equity share and
future returns. That is, when expected returns go up with risk, the proba-
bility of financial distress for a given capital structure rises. And if tax sched-
ules are convex, the expected benefit of debt tax shields falls. Given that the
costs of leverage increase and the benefits fall, higher risk and returns de-
mand more equity, not less. But even if one conjectures the opposite, this
channel does not receive empirical support: the predictive power of the eq-
uity share does not diminish after controlling for aggregate leverage directly.
In sum, we do not find support for any of these efficient market explana-
tions for the results. We may have overlooked other potential explanations,
but one fact gives pause: the results imply a statistical model of market
returns that sometimes predicts significantly negative returns. Because ex-
pected returns on the market overall are likely to be positive in any rational
model, it is hard to square this with market efficiency. This approach to
testing market efficiency has been taken by Fama and Schwert ~1977! with
the short rate, Fama and French ~1988a! with the aggregate dividend yield,
and Kothari and Shanken ~1997! with the aggregate book-to-market. In con-
trast to the results of those studies, we find that the equity share sometimes
predicts significantly negative returns even for the value-weighted market.
This evidence, and the fact that we cannot find support for any particular
efficient market explanation, leads us to conclude that managerial timing of
an inefficient equity market is the most credible explanation of our results.
Finally, we would like to mention an interesting and related paper by
Nelson ~1999!, which, like Loughran et al. ~1994! and this paper, also con-
siders the relationship between aggregate financing patterns and aggregate
stock returns.2 Nelson’s paper can be distinguished from this paper in a few
ways. First, he uses the percentage change in shares outstanding as the
financing variable of interest, whereas we use gross new equity issues scaled
by gross new equity and debt issues. We believe that the equity share vari-
able better isolates timing motives for issuance from pure investment mo-
tives and variation in investment opportunities. Nelson’s net series does
have the advantage of controlling for repurchases. ~We show in Appendix A
that controlling for repurchases makes little practical difference to our re-
sults, however.! Second, Nelson focuses on a five-year prediction horizon, whereas
we focus on a shorter one-year horizon. Third, we go farther than both Nelson
and Loughran et al. in ruling out efficient market explanations of the results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the data on aggregate
new issues and other data that we use. Section II presents the main empir-
ical results. Section III evaluates efficient market and market timing expla-
2 Lamont ~1998! finds that the dividend-payout ratio forecasts high future returns. When
dividends are viewed as a source of finance, this predictability is consistent with our findings
on the equity share.
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nations. Section IV summarizes and discusses some important implications
of our results for long-run event studies of managerial actions.
I. Data
For a study of equity market timing, the ideal measure of new finance
composition is the share of net new corporate finance raised through public
equity issues. The key benefit of the equity share is that it isolates potential
timing motives from the level of investment itself. Unfortunately, data are
not easily available to construct an ideal measure. Net new finance comes
from many sources, including internal finance, new bank debt net of retire-
ments, public and private debt issues also net of retirements, and public and
privately placed equity issues net of repurchases. Not all of these data series
are available for a significant time period. Our approach is to use a rela-
tively unadjusted series of gross new equity and debt issues. We show in
Appendix A that various adjustments make little difference to the main re-
sults. The data are available at the second author’s home page, currently
http:00som.yale.edu0;jaw52.
A. Aggregate Equity and Debt Issues Data, 1927–1996
The Federal Reserve Bulletin has reported monthly levels of equity issues
~common and preferred! and debt issues ~public and private! since 1927.
Through 1952, the Bulletin’s primary source for issues data is the Commer-
cial and Financial Chronicle. After 1952, the Bulletin reports data gathered
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Our basic data are the annual
totals of equity issues ~common and preferred! and long-term debt issues
~public and private! collected from Bulletin issues between 1927 and 1996.
The data series are gross totals of equity and debt issues that do not sub-
tract out repurchases or debt retirements. In Appendix A, we show that ad-
justing this series by subtracting out repurchases, junk and convertible debt,
and utilities issues makes little difference to the main results.
The Federal Reserve Board’s f low of funds provides an alternative source
of data on net changes in debt and equity for the economy as a whole. In
contrast to the series that we use, these net series subtract repurchases and
debt retirements. Unfortunately, there are also disadvantages. The first is
that the series include exchange issues and retirements associated with merger
activity. Merger activity is often an order of magnitude larger than normal
operations finance. As a result, mergers tend to drive the f low of funds se-
ries.3 A second disadvantage of the f low of funds series is that it does not
begin until 1946. Nonetheless, in Appendix A, we show that the f low of
funds data give similar results. All things considered, we lean toward using
the unadjusted gross series in the body of the paper.
3 We thank Jean Helwege and researchers at the Federal Reserve Board for pointing
this out.
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B. Hot Markets
The aggregate equity and debt issue series are presented in Figures 1A
and 1B. We adjust both to millions of 1995 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index. Panel A of Table I reports summary statistics for these series.
Several features of these series are apparent from the plots. First, both
series are quite variable. Equity issues are even more variable than debt
issues. The standard deviation of the annual growth rate is 96 percent for
equity issues and 57 percent for debt issues. Second, hot equity markets,
in terms of volume, are apparent.4 Figure 1A shows at least five hot mar-
kets for equity between 1927 and 1996. A peak occurred in 1929, when real
new issues surged to $60 billion, a level not reached again until 1983. This
level is even more astounding when compared to the size of the stock
market. In 1929, new equity represented 11.6 percent of the dollar value of
outstanding equity reported by CRSP. By contrast, in 1993, another record
year, new issues comprised only 2.3 percent of outstanding equity. Equity
issues also peaked in 1971, 1983, and 1986. Third, debt issues rose dra-
matically in the 1980s and again in the early 1990s. Real new debt issues
increased by a factor of six between 1982 and 1986. Offerings peaked at
$630 billion in 1993, about twice the 1986 level. These increases ref lect a
variety of factors, including lower inf lation expectations and a growing
market for junk bonds.
The issue series are totals that lump together a few different types of
issues. For example, the equity issues include not only IPOs and SEOs of
operating companies but also issues by closed-end funds. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to disaggregate issues by type for the entire period. But bits of
data reported in the Bulletin and other sources give a sense of how uses of
new issues capital vary over time. For example, a large number of closed-end
funds were started in 1929. The December 1929 Bulletin reports that in the
first 10 months of 1929, closed-end company issues represented 42 percent
of all domestic corporate security issues. During this period, closed-end funds
were priced at large premiums.5 The crash sullied the image of these invest-
ment companies for decades after, and they do not represent a large portion
of more recent equity issues.
Figure 1A does not reveal the fact that net equity issues were actually
negative during most of the 1980s and some of the 1990s, as reported
in the Federal Reserve Board’s f low of funds data. This is a consequence
of simultaneous increases in repurchase activity and the use of debt to
finance acquisitions ~retiring equity in the process!. Nevertheless, the
share of equity in total new issues was also low during this period, and
gives a similar impression of financing patterns as the net equity issues
series.
4 Ibbotson and Jaffe ~1975! define hot IPO markets as periods during which initial ~first-
month! IPO returns are particularly high.
5 De Long and Shleifer ~1991! discuss closed-end fund issues and discounts around the 1929
crash.
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PANEL A. Equity issue volume (e) in $95M
PANEL B. Debt issue volume (d ) in $95M
PANEL C. The equity share in total new issues (S = e/(e + d ))
Figure 1. Equity and debt issues, 1927–1996. Equity and debt issue volumes are from the
Federal Reserve Bulletin. The equity series ~A! includes both common and preferred equity
issues. The debt series ~B! includes both public and private debt issues. The equity share in
total new issues ~C! is the fraction of equity issues in total issues. The equity and debt series
are converted to 1995 dollars using the Consumer Price Index from Ibbotson Associates ~1998!.
The data are available at the second author’s web page, currently http:00som.yale.edu0;jaw52.
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C. Relatively Hot Markets: The Share of Equity in Total New Issues
We scale equity issues ~e! by the sum of equity and debt issues ~e 1 d!. The
gross equity and debt issue quantities do not net out repurchases and debt
retirements, and the denominator does not include bank debt, internal fi-
nance, or finance raised in foreign markets.6 Despite these shortcomings, we
believe that the share of equity in gross equity and debt issues is a reason-
able ref lection of how firms favor equity or debt over time.7
Figure 1C plots the equity share in new issues from 1927 to 1996, and
Panel A of Table I shows some summary statistics. In a typical year, about
21 percent of new issues are equity. The average equity share was about 22
percent between 1927 and 1961 and 20 percent between 1962 and 1996. Due
to the high volatility of the equity share in the Depression years, we exam-
ine its predictive ability in the full period and separately in the first and
second halves of the sample.
Variation in the equity share series comes from both the equity and debt
components. The unscaled equity series spikes in 1929, 1971, 1983, 1986,
and 1993. Figure 1C shows that the equity market is “relatively hot” in
1929, 1933, 1937, 1946, and 1983. Only two of these years overlap. Some-
times the equity market is hot but the debt market is even hotter, and some-
times the equity market is cold but the debt market is even colder. More
recently, the debt market has been relatively hot—although equity issues
have hit record levels and hot IPOs have grabbed headlines, debt issues
have grown even faster, keeping the equity share low.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the equity share in new issues was
near the middle of its historical range in 1996. The dividend yield and the
book-to-market ratio, by contrast, were extraordinarily low in 1996 ~Camp-
bell and Shiller ~1998!!.
D. Other Data
We compare the equity share to other known predictors of market returns.
The best-known predictors are the aggregate book-to-market ratio ~Kothari
and Shanken ~1997!, Pontiff and Schall ~1998!! and the aggregate dividend
yield ~Campbell and Shiller ~1988!, Fama and French ~1988a!!. In addition,
Fama and Schwert ~1977! find that the short interest rate is a bearish pre-
dictor of nominal market returns, and Keim and Stambaugh ~1986!, among
others, find that the slope of the yield curve is a bullish predictor.
6 Between 1927 and 1950, the Bulletin subdivides equity and debt issues into “new” and
“refunding,” based upon the company’s stated purpose for the issue. Refunding finance replaces
retired debt or repurchased equity. Between 1927 and 1950, new and total debt issues have a
correlation of 0.74, and new and total equity issues have a correlation of 0.99. This provides
some comfort in using total issues as a proxy for net issues.
7 Hickman ~1953! studies the relative frequency of equity to debt offers in the 1900 to 1938
period, and Moore ~1983! studies the 1946 to 1970 period.
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Panel B of Table I reports summary statistics for these variables. The
Dow Jones Industrial Average ~DJIA! book-to-market series is denoted by
B0M.8 The value-weighted dividend yield ~VW D0P! and equal-weighted
dividend yield ~EW D0P! apply to the value-weighted and equal-weighted
indices from the Center for Research on Security Prices ~CRSP!. The trea-
sury bill return ~BILL! and the difference between the long-term govern-
ment bond and Treasury bill yields ~TERM! are from Ibbotson Associates
~1998!.
Panel C of Table I reports summary statistics for the CRSP value-weighted
and equal-weighted market indices for various periods. Equal-weighted re-
turns have been higher on average, and more volatile, than value-weighted
returns.
II. The Equity Share as a Predictor of Stock Market Returns
This section describes the predictive power of the equity share for market
returns. First, we outline the direction and economic significance of the pre-
dictive power. Next, we compare the univariate predictive power of the div-
idend yield, the book-to-market ratio, and the equity share. Finally, we show
that the equity share adds new explanatory power to these and other known
predictors.
A. Preliminary Analysis
Stock market returns tend to be high following low equity share years
and low following high equity share years. Figure 2 illustrates this. We
divide the 70 sample years into quartiles according to the prior-year equity
share. In the year after bottom-quartile equity share years ~below 0.14!,
real value-weighted returns average 14 percent But in the year after
top-quartile years ~above 0.27!, real value-weighted returns average
26 percent. As a group, firms lean toward equity just before the market
declines.
For value-weighted returns, most of the action appears to be in this high
quartile. For equal-weighted returns, however, there is action in both of the
extreme quartiles. Equal-weighted market returns average 27 percent fol-
lowing bottom-quartile equity share years, versus 28 percent following top-
quartile equity share years.
8 Kothari and Shanken ~1997! and Pontiff and Schall ~1998! measure annual returns start-
ing at the end of March, to be sure that the book values in the book-to-market measure are
available before the return period. The book values apply to prior December fiscal year-ends, at
the latest. For simplicity, we assume that the book values are known at the beginning of the
year. This allows us to use the annual issues data reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin and
the calendar year returns used by most prior authors.
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Figures 3A and 3B split the sample into halves. Figure 3A shows the av-
erage equal-weighted and value-weighted return for the year before a low
equity share year and the five years after, whereas Figure 3B plots the same
results around high equity share years. These figures reveal two interesting
facts. First, the equity share is related to past returns. Figure 3A shows that
firms lean away from equity after a year of low market returns, and Fig-
ure 3B shows that firms lean toward equity after a year of high returns.
This confirms firm-level findings by Marsh ~1982! and aggregate results by
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda ~1993!. Second, the equity share’s predictive power
continues into the second year. Returns are high in each of the two years
following a low equity share year and low in each of the two years following
a high equity share year.
Table II tabulates the data in Figure 3 more formally. We compare the mean
returns in the 10 years surrounding a low equity share year to the mean re-
turns in the 10 years surrounding a high equity share year. The table confirms
that firms lean toward equity after one year of high returns and before two
years of low returns. As suggested by Figure 2, most of these contrasts are even
larger when comparing top-quartile and bottom-quartile years instead of top-
half and bottom-half years.
Figure 2. Mean equity returns by prior-year equity share in new issues, 1928–1997.
Mean annual real returns on the CRSP value-weighted ~light! and equal-weighted ~solid! in-
dexes by quartile of the prior-year share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues. Real
returns are created using the Consumer Price Index from Ibbotson Associates ~1998!.
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PANEL A. Mean returns on the VW CRSP (light) and EW (solid) CRSP
indexes around low equity share years.
PANEL B. Mean returns on the VW CRSP (light) and EW (solid) CRSP
indexes around high equity share years.
Figure 3. Mean past and future equity returns by equity share in new issues, 1928–
1997. Figure 3A plots mean past and future real annual returns on the CRSP value-weighted
~light! and equal-weighted ~solid! indexes for below-median equity share years. Figure 3B plots
mean returns around above-median equity share years. Real returns are created using the
Consumer Price Index from Ibbotson Associates ~1998!.
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B. Univariate Regressions
In this subsection we compare the univariate predictive power of the div-
idend yield, the book-to-market ratio, and the equity share for equity mar-
ket returns. Table III presents OLS regressions of one-year-ahead stock returns
~RE ! on these predictors ~X!:
REt 5 a 1 bXt21 1 ut . ~1!
The predictor variables are standardized so that the coeff icients are
comparable—a one standard deviation increase in X predicts b percent higher
returns.9
We estimate equation ~1! over the full sample period and over the first and
second halves. Panel A reports estimates for the full period. The adjusted R2
for the equity share is 0.12 for value-weighted returns and 0.16 for equal-
weighted returns. A one standard deviation increase in the equity share ~0.11!
reduces average value-weighted returns by about 7 percent. For equal-
weighted returns, the effect is larger. In the full period, the book-to-market
ratio ~B0M ! does about as well as the equity share in predicting equal-
weighted returns but not nearly as well in predicting value-weighted re-
turns. As a consequence, B0M is best at predicting a measure of small stock
returns, the difference between the equal-weighted and value-weighted re-
turns. The dividend-to-price ratio is marginally significant for both equal-
weighted and value-weighted returns but is not as strong as the equity share.
In the full sample, the equity share is the best single explanatory variable
for both equal-weighted and value-weighted returns.
Panel B and Panel C confirm that each of the variables has some predic-
tive power within certain subperiods, with exceptions: the dividend yield
~D0P! does not predict the first half equal-weighted returns, and B0M does
not predict the second half value-weighted returns. The coefficients on D0P
and B0M also tend to vary dramatically across the two periods. In contrast,
the equity share has roughly the same economic and statistical significance
in both periods.
We have also split the sample by prewar and postwar subperiods to ex-
amine the robustness of the equity share’s performance in the volatile De-
pression years. We find it is statistically significant and of similar magnitude
across these subperiods also. For VW returns, the coefficient is 26.70 ~t 5
22.70! using 1928 to 1945 returns and 28.96 ~t 5 22.61! using the 1946 to
1997 returns. For EW returns, the coefficient is 213.21 ~t 5 22.73! using
1928 to 1945 returns and 213.06 ~t 5 22.60! using the 1946 to 1997 returns.
9 If predictability could ref lect inefficiency, it is inaccurate to state that X captures variation
in “expected returns.” One needs to define who is doing the expecting. It certainly would not be
the investors holding long positions during a period of predictably low or negative returns. We
think it is better to take the more agnostic view that X ref lects in-sample predictability, given
the model rather than the potentially misleading phrase, “expected returns.”
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In Appendix A, we show that netting out repurchases, or making other
allowances for junk and convertible debt or utilities issues, is of little con-
sequence to the univariate results. The resulting series tend to be highly
correlated with our unadjusted equity share series, and the predictive power
is essentially the same.
On a statistical point, it has been noted that the D0P and B0M coefficients
are subject to an upward small-sample bias.10 Nelson and Kim ~1993! show
this in a simple system:
REt 5 a 1 bXt21 1 ut , ~2!
Xt 5 c 1 dXt21 1 vt . ~3!
In this setup, the bias in estimating the OLS coefficient for b depends on the
contemporaneous covariance between the two residuals, u and v, and the
bias in the OLS estimate of d ~Stambaugh ~2000!!:
E @ Zb 2 b# 5
suv
sv
2 E @ Zd 2 d # . ~4!
where the hats denote OLS estimates.
For the scaled-price variables, one expects the residuals of equation ~3!
to covary negatively with the residuals from equation ~2!. For example, an
unusually high return increases the denominator of the scaled-price pre-
dictor. In addition, the bias in estimating d is also negative ~Kendall ~1954!!.
From equation ~4!, the OLS estimate of b is biased upward for D0P and
B0M. Therefore Table III overstates the economic significance of these
predictors.
We do not expect the equity share coefficient to be similarly biased be-
cause it is not highly autocorrelated and it is not a scaled-price variable. To
verify this, we calculated the empirical correlation for the OLS residuals for
equations ~2! and ~3! for each of the three predictor variables. The results
are presented in Table IV. For the book-to-market ratio and dividend yield,
we replicate the findings of Kothari and Shanken ~1997!. There is a signif-
icant negative contemporaneous correlation between the residuals ranging
from 20.7 to 20.9. The equity share residuals, by contrast, show little cor-
relation. Table IV also reports bias-adjusted estimators based on Kendall’s
correction for autocorrelated regressors, as suggested by Kothari and Shan-
ken. The scaled-price variables’ bias-adjusted coefficient estimates are 15
percent to 45 percent smaller than their OLS estimates, but the adjustment
makes almost no difference for the equity share.
10 Kothari and Shanken ~1997! discuss this issue in more detail.
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C. Multivariate Regressions
In this section we examine the incremental power of the equity share over
other predictors of aggregate returns. Table V presents OLS regressions of
equity market index returns ~RE ! on past returns, the Treasury bill return
Table IV
Correlation of the Residuals for the Univariate Market
Regression and the Predictor Autoregression, 1928–1997
OLS regressions of annual real equity market returns and autoregressions for three predictors:
REt 5 a 1 bXt21 1 ut
Xt 5 c 1 dXt21 1 vt
where RE denotes real percentage returns on the CRSP value-weighted ~VW! or equal-weighted
~EW! portfolio and X variously denotes the dividend-to-price ratio ~D0P!, the book-to-market
ratio ~B0M !, or the equity share in total new equity and debt issues ~S 5 e0~e 1 d!!. Panel A
shows OLS estimates of a and b. Panel B shows estimates of c and d. Panel C shows estimates
of the correlation between the two residuals, u and v, and tests its significance level against a
null hypothesis of zero correlation. In addition, we calculate bias-adjusted estimates of b fol-
lowing Kothari and Shanken ~1997, equation ~4!!. The dividend-to-price ratio, the book-to-
market ratio, and the equity share are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance.
t-statistics are shown in brackets using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
D0P B0M S
VW CRSP EW CRSP VW CRSP EW CRSP VW CRSP EW CRSP
Panel A: Market Return OLS regression
Intercept a 8.72 13.96 8.87 14.07 8.93 14.17
@3.65# @3.75# @3.70# @4.08# @3.89# @4.10#
Slope b 5.01 5.75 4.61 13.06 27.42 213.12
@2.12# @2.04# @1.79# @2.83# @23.86# @23.64#
OR2 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.16
Panel B: Predictor OLS Autoregression
Intercept c 23.20 22.26 20.39 21.07
@20.48# @20.42# @20.05# @20.10#
Slope d 0.85 0.91 0.78 0.45
@9.12# @17.44# @7.17# @2.41#
OR2 0.68 0.80 0.57 0.19
Panel C: Bias-Adjusted Estimate
ruv 20.70 20.67 20.87 20.78 0.11 0.11
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.36
suv 0sv
2 224.46 245.82 226.61 234.43 2.33 3.54
Bias adjusted b 3.71 3.20 3.28 11.35 27.34 213.00
N 70 70 70 70 70 70
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~BILL!, the term premium ~TERM!, the dividend yield ~D0P!, the book-to-
market ratio ~B0M !, and the equity share ~S!:
REt 5 a 1 b1 REt21 1 b2 BILLt21 1 b3TERMt21 1 b4 D0Pt21 1 b5 B0Mt21
1 b6 St21 1 ut . ~5!
Fama and French ~1988b! and Poterba and Summers ~1988! find that mar-
ket returns have a small negative autocorrelation at one-year horizons, so
we include the lagged market return. The last three predictor variables are
again standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. We estimate equa-
tion ~5! over the full sample period and over the first and second halves.
Table V
Multivariate OLS Regressions for Predicting
One-Year-Ahead Market Returns
OLS regressions of annual real equity market returns on multiple predictors:
REt 5 a 1 b1 REt21 1 b2 BILLt21 1 b3TERMt21 1 b4 D0Pt21 1 b5 B0Mt21 1 b6 St21 1 ut
where RE denotes real percentage returns on the CRSP value-weighted ~VW! or equal-weighted
~EW! portfolio, BILL denotes the return on Treasury bills, TERM denotes the yield premium of
long-term government bonds over treasuries, D0P denotes the dividend-to-price ratio, B0M de-
notes the book-to-market ratio, and S denotes the equity share in new issues. The dividend-to-
price ratio, the book-to-market ratio, and the equity share are standardized to have zero mean
and unit variance. t-statistics are shown in brackets using heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors.
1928–1997 Returns 1928–1962 Returns 1963–1997 Returns
VW CRSP EW CRSP VW CRSP EW CRSP VW CRSP EW CRSP
Intercept 6.95 21.72 14.33 21.71 11.50 19.23
@1.13# @1.68# @0.53# @0.76# @0.78# @1.16#
RE 0.05 0.08 0.27 0.20 20.20 20.09
@0.39# @0.82# @1.12# @1.09# @21.01# @20.68#
BILL 0.71 20.85 4.96 9.60 0.66 4.20
@0.89# @20.47# @0.75# @1.28# @0.40# @1.46#
TERM 20.86 23.66 27.98 210.86 0.15 6.09
@20.41# @20.96# @20.70# @20.84# @0.08# @1.45#
D0P 4.26 21.58 24.37 29.17 14.51 63.21
@1.13# @20.27# @20.51# @21.55# @1.43# @2.41#
B0M 1.51 13.50 19.59 34.10 27.30 214.30
@0.38# @2.38# @1.99# @6.34# @21.29# @21.47#
S 27.88 213.17 28.84 214.34 28.27 213.63
1 @23.97# @23.77# @21.94# @22.21# @22.13# @22.48#
OR2 0.12 0.28 0.27 0.51 0.12 0.29
N 70 70 35 35 35 35
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Table V shows that, across different sample periods and market return
indices, the equity share is the most consistently significant predictive vari-
able. For the entire period, the equity share is significant at the one percent
level for both value-weighted and equal-weighted returns. Neither the div-
idend yield nor the book-to-market ratio is significant for value-weighted
returns. The book-to-market ratio’s strong first half performance is enough
to make it significant for equal-weighted returns over the full period, but it
does not help to predict value-weighted returns. In fact, both the B0M and
D0P coefficients change sign from the first half to the second half. Pontiff
and Schall ~1998! discuss the erratic predictive ability of B0M in more detail.
There does not appear to be any mean reversion ~conditional on the other
variables! at the one-year horizon.11 Finally, the bond market variables we
consider are weak predictors of real returns.12
The equity share is not significantly correlated with either the dividend
yield or the book-to-market ratio. Therefore its predictive power is comple-
mentary. However, the scaled-price variables are themselves highly corre-
lated, as Kothari and Shanken ~1997! show. In our sample the correlation
between VW D0P ~EW D0P! and B0M is 0.68 ~0.43! and is statistically sig-
nificant. Because book value and dividends are both highly persistent, most
of the variation in the scaled-price variables comes from changes in their
common denominator.
One implication of this high correlation is that the parameter instability
of these coefficients may in part ref lect collinearity. A second implication is
that looking at the scaled-price variables separately may understate their
combined significance. To evaluate the latter possibility, we perform an
F-test of the hypothesis that D0P and B0M together have no predictive
power. For the full sample, we can almost reject this hypothesis at the five
percent level for value-weighted returns ~ p-value 5 0.053!. This hypothesis
is more strongly rejected for equal-weighted returns; in the full sample,
scaled-price variables do have some joint explanatory power for equal-
weighted returns, even after the equity share and other conditioning vari-
ables are included.
III. Interpreting the Results: Efficient Market or Market Timing?
Unless we agree that rational expected returns are constant, the fact that
the equity share predicts returns does not by itself demonstrate inefficiency.
In this section we consider three ways in which the equity share in new
11 The five-year average equity share does not do well at predicting average returns over the
next five years ~unreported!. This highlights the fact that the equity share’s predictive power
comes at a much shorter horizon than the mean reversion documented in Fama and French
~1988b! and Poterba and Summers ~1988!.
12 The deviation of the Treasury yield from its six-month moving average produces a stron-
ger negative coefficient than that which we report for BILL. Use of this alternative short-term
rate indicator does not change the predictive power of the equity share, however.
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issues could be negatively related to rationally time-varying returns. Find-
ing that none is supported by the data, we turn to the market timing
explanation.
A. Modigliani and Miller Effect
In the framework of Modigliani and Miller ~1958!, an increase in leverage
causes an increase in the expected return on equity. Because aggregate le-
verage tends to increase when the equity share is low, this effect produces a
negative relationship between the equity share and future returns, as we
found empirically.
However, the empirical equity share coefficient is much too large to be
explained by this effect. In particular, it is straightforward to show that the
first-order effect of new issues, as measured by the equity share, on expected
equity returns is
dE @RE #
dS
5
2aE @RA 2 RD#
S 2
~6!
where a is the ratio of new equity issues to the aggregate value of equity
including the new issues, E @RA 2 RD# is the expected excess return of total
corporate assets over corporate debt, and S is the equity share in new issues.13
We can use historical averages to measure these quantities and then com-
pare the predicted theoretical effect of the equity share with the actual co-
efficient in Table III and Table V. From 1927 to 1996, the average ratio of
new equity issues to the aggregate market value of equity was 1.7 percent.
Over the same period, the average excess large company stock return over
corporate debt was approximately 6.5 percent, as reported in Ibbotson As-
sociates ~1998!. Because expected equity returns must be higher than ex-
pected asset returns, this represents an upper bound for the excess return of
assets over debt. Finally, the average equity share in new issues was 0.21.
Plugging these values into equation ~6! gives a bound of 22.5. To compare
this with the standardized empirical results, we multiply by 0.11, the stan-
dard deviation of the equity share. This yields a predicted theoretical equity
share coefficient of 20.28, as compared to actual coefficients between 27.42
~from the univariate analysis! and 27.88 ~from the multivariate analysis!.
This analysis indicates that the leverage risk effect explains less than one-
twentieth of the equity share’s actual effect.
13 The first step is to write postissue leverage as a weighted average of the leverage exclud-
ing new issues and the leverage of the new issues themselves. The second step is to rewrite the
leverage of new issues in terms of the equity share. The third step is to substitute the resulting
expression for postissue leverage L into the Modigliani and Miller arbitrage condition E @RE # 5
E @RA# 1 L@RA 2 RD# . The final step is to differentiate E @RE # with respect to S. We ignore the
derivative of RD with respect to S and therefore derive an upper bound impact of the equity
share on returns. The true impact is closer to zero.
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B. Investment
The equity share could be negatively related to rationally time-varying
future returns through investment. For example, if the rational discount
rate falls, firms will increase investment, and the equity share may increase
incidentally if firms follow a pecking-order policy. Myers and Majluf ~1984!
show that when managers have information that investors do not have, ex-
ternal finance is more costly than internal finance, and equity is more costly
than debt. If in addition firms have a fixed debt capacity, the ratio of equity
to external finance will increase with financing requirements, that is, the
equity share rises with investment.
This story makes the additional prediction that the level of investment
forecasts rational variation in returns. Importantly, as we show using a model
of investment and financing based on Stein ~1996!, optimal investment need
not depend on variation in returns due to mispricing. We develop these theo-
retical predictions and then check whether the level of aggregate investment
is actually negatively related to subsequent returns. Because it is not, we do
not advocate explanation for the equity share’s predictive power based on a
link through investment to a time-varying discount rate.
Stein argues that there are three factors that determine the level and
composition of securities issues: the value of the investment opportunity
itself; the market timing gain ~if any! associated with new issues; and the
cost of deviating from optimal capital structure. In a simple reduced form,
these factors may be summarized in the following managerial decision prob-
lem for a representative firm:
max
S, I
f ~I ! 2 ~1 1 E @RA#! I 2 dSI 2 i ~SI ! 2 z~~S 2 OS! I !. ~7!
The manager chooses the equity share in new issues, S, and the level of total
equity and debt issues, I. The product SI therefore denotes the level of eq-
uity issues ~e elsewhere in the paper!, and I 2 SI denotes the level of debt
issues ~d elsewhere!.
The project’s expected payoff is f ~{!, which is increasing and concave. The
rational expected return on financial assets is E @RA# , which may vary from
period to period. The third and fourth terms represent the market timing
gains associated with equity issues. d is the irrational component of expected
equity returns and also may vary from period to period. ~When equity is
overpriced, d is negative.! The announcement effect associated with equity
issues and repurchases, i~{!, is represented by a cost function that is U-shaped
around zero. Thus, the bigger is the announced equity issue or repurchase,
the more suspicious new shareholders are that they are being exploited, and
the more they revalue the firm to reduce the scope for market timing. The
cost of deviating from optimal capital structure is given by the final term,
z~{!, which is also U-shaped around zero. We assume the firm’s optimal cap-
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ital structure would be maintained if the manager set the equity share at OS.
Above OS, agency costs and lost tax shields exceed reductions in expected
financial distress costs. Below OS, the opposite is true.14
The comparative statics of this program show how investment and the
equity share respond to the parameters E @RA# and d. Note this model does
not explain how or why the market may be mispriced in the f irst place.
Instead, it guides a search for comparative statics predictions that may help
to discriminate between efficient market and inefficient market explanations
for our main results, a relationship between financing activity and returns.
We would ideally like to compute comparative statics with respect to E @RE #
~the rational expected return on equity! and d because full-information ex-
pected equity returns are E @RE # 1 d. In a rational model of returns, there is
a direct link between E @RE # and E @RA# through a Modigliani and Miller
relationship. Of course, equation ~6! shows that E @RE # also depends on the
change in leverage induced by new issues, but we just found the effect to be
negligible.
In Panel A of Table VI, we report comparative statics results for the effi-
cient markets case: E @RA# varies over time, but d is always zero. The cal-
culations are in Appendix B. The comparative statics turn out to be sensitive
to whether information costs, i ~{!, or suboptimal leverage costs, z~{!, domi-
nate, so we report results for both cases. In the first case, information costs
are assumed to dominate. When required returns E @RA# increase, for in-
stance, investment falls. Because the announcement effect is increasing in
the dollar value of equity issues ~SI!, a lower level of investment allows a
larger share of equity issues. Thus, S rises with E @RA# .
In the second case, the cost of deviating from optimal leverage is assumed
to dominate. Because there is an announcement effect, the equity share will
always be below the share that keeps leverage at the optimum, OS. As before,
when required returns increase, investment falls. Now, because the cost of
deviating from optimal leverage is increasing in the dollar value of equity
issues, lower investment allows an even smaller equity share, so S falls.
The second case demonstrates how, in some circumstances, a high equity
share could forecast low equity returns even in the absence of a timing mo-
tive. But an unambiguous prediction of all efficient markets cases is that
there should be a strong negative relationship between investment and sub-
sequent returns. This is true regardless of the structure of information and
suboptimal leverage costs.
In Panel B, we summarize predictions of the polar inefficient markets
case: E @RA# is constant, but d varies. The results are quite different from the
efficient markets case. If information costs dominate, mispricing has little
14 See Stein’s paper ~1996! for more discussion of the structure of equation ~7!. Despite the
simplifications apparent in this stylized setup, some issues still have to be ignored to keep the
analysis tractable. For one, the model assumes no internal finance is available; investment
equals the total raised through new issues. The model also ignores the option to delay investment.
The Equity Share in New Issues 2239
effect on investment. Investment is primarily determined by E @RA# , which
is assumed roughly constant, so the upshot is that one observes no correla-
tion between investment and subsequent equity returns. And now timing
motives are apparent: the equity share rises when equity is overvalued, that
is, when d is negative.
If suboptimal leverage costs dominate, on the other hand, investment and
financing are not separable. In the absence of mispricing, the equity share
would be set at OS. But maintaining this ratio imposes costs and benefits
through d. The negative relationship between investment and returns reap-
pears, but the relationship between the equity share and returns can go
either way, depending on the degree of mispricing.
The takeaway is that investment should be strongly negatively related to
rational, predictable variation in returns but need not be related to returns
driven by mispricing. To evaluate the empirical link between investment
and subsequent returns, we gather net nonresidential fixed capital stock
Table VI
Comparative Statics of an Investment and Financing Model
This table summarizes comparative statics predictions made by a representative-firm security
issue model based on Stein ~1996!:
max
S, I
f ~I ! 2 ~1 1 E @RA# ! I 2 dSI 2 i ~SI ! 2 z~~S 2 OS! I !.
The manager chooses the equity share ~S 5 e0e 1 d! and the level of investment ~I 5 e 1 d! to
maximize an objective that depends on the project’s expected payoff ~ f ~{!!, the rational cost of
capital ~E @RA# !, the irrational component of equity returns ~d!, the information cost ~announce-
ment effect! of equity issues ~i ~{!!, and the cost of deviating from optimal capital structure
~z~{!!. f ~{! is increasing and concave, and i ~{! and z~{! are U-shaped around zero. In Panel A,
variation in full-information expected equity returns is entirely rational. In Panel B, equity
mispricing ~d! drives full-information expected equity returns. The relationships are derived in
Appendix B.
Response to Determinants of
Equity Returns ~E @RA# and d!
Case
Investment
~I!
Equity Share
~S!
Panel A: Efficient Market ~E @RA# varies rationally, d 5 0!
Information costs ~i! dominate suboptimal leverage costs ~z! 2 1
Suboptimal leverage costs dominate information costs 2 2
Panel B: Inefficient Market ~E @RA# constant, d varies!
Information costs dominate suboptimal leverage costs 0 2
Suboptimal leverage costs dominate information costs 2 ?
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data from the Survey of Current Business, United States Department of Com-
merce, August 1994 issue. We define investment as the change in this cap-
ital stock.15
We find a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between the
level of investment and the equity share, which is suggestive of pecking-
order financing. The relationship between aggregate investment and sub-
sequent stock returns is also weak. Between 1928 and 1995, the correlation
between aggregate investment ~the ratio of investment to the capital stock!
and one-year-ahead value-weighted returns is 20.09, not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Table VII presents regressions of returns on lagged invest-
ment. Column ~1! shows that investment is negatively but not strongly
associated with future value-weighted returns.
Column ~2! shows that how investment is financed is much more impor-
tant than the level of investment itself. The three independent variables
are new equity over the capital stock, new debt over capital stock, and
residual investment ~internally financed investment! over the capital stock.
In frictionless capital markets, when the level of investment is the critical
predictor, the three separate coefficients need not differ. This restriction is
rejected at the one percent level of significance. ~For value-weighted re-
turns, F2,63 is 4.99 and the p-value is 0.0098, and for equal weighted re-
turns, F2,63 is 6.03 and the p-value is 0.0040.! Column ~3! shows that the
predictive power of the equity share is unchanged when we control for the
level of investment.
An alternative measure of corporate investment is the sum of new equity
and new debt issues—the denominator of the equity share. In column ~4!,
we replace investment with total new issues scaled by the lagged equity
market capitalization from CRSP ~MVE!. The results are similar to those
of column ~3!. We also tried using just the level of equity issues scaled by
MVE. This variable is significantly negative when included alone but be-
comes insignificant when included alongside the equity share, which re-
mains strongly significant. Columns ~5! through ~8! present similar results
for equal-weighted returns.
In sum, we do not find evidence that our results for the equity share are
driven by the level of total investment, the level of total new issues, or the
level of equity issues. Instead, the way investment is financed ~in particular,
as measured by the equity share! appears to contain the most information
for future returns. In terms of the model, our joint results for the equity
share and investment are most consistent with the predictions of an ineffi-
cient markets case–the first case in Table VI, Panel B—where announce-
ment costs of equity issues dominate capital structure costs.
15 Note that closed-end fund issues do not increase real investment. Therefore the efficient
market version of the model is not able to explain why this component of the equity share would
predict equity returns.
The Equity Share in New Issues 2241
C. Omitted Factors Driving Both Capital Structure Changes and Returns
One generalization of the model might allow the ideal capital structure OS
to vary with E @RA# , for example, through risk. Traditional theory points
toward a positive, not negative, relationship between the equity share and
future returns. That is, when expected returns go up with risk, the proba-
bility of financial distress for a given capital structure rises. And because
Table VII
New Issues, Investment, and Equity Market Returns
OLS regressions of annual real equity market returns on the level and composition of investment:
REt 5 a 1 b1~I0K !t21 1 b2~e0K !t21 1 b3~d0K !t21 1 b4 @~I 2 e 2 d!0K # t21 1 b5 @~e 1 d!0MVE # t21
1 b6 St21 1 ut
where RE denotes real percentage returns on the CRSP value-weighted ~VW! or equal-weighted
~EW! portfolio, I0K denotes aggregate investment relative to the aggregate capital stock, e0K
denotes new equity issues relative to the capital stock, d0K denotes new debt issues relative to
the capital stock, @~I 2 e 2 d!0K# denotes investment from sources other than new issues rel-
ative to the capital stock, ~e 1 d!0MVE denotes total issues relative to aggregate market cap-
italization, and S denotes the equity share in total new equity and debt issues. Investment is
defined as the change in the net nonresidential fixed capital stock, which is from the Survey of
Current Business, United States Department of Commerce, August 1994 issue. MVE is calcu-
lated as the total market capitalization from CRSP. The equity share in new issues ~S! and ~e 1
d!0MVE are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. t-statistics are shown in brack-
ets using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
VW CRSP EW CRSP
~1! ~2! ~3! ~4! ~5! ~6! ~7! ~8!
Intercept 10.77 20.46 9.96 8.63 20.41 35.89 18.93 14.09
@2.37# @3.90# @2.52# @3.72# @2.53# @3.60# @2.78# @4.09#
I0K 20.43 20.27 21.05 20.75
@20.88# @20.65# @21.16# @21.01#
e0K 21.26 22.53
@22.67# @22.67#
d0K 20.98 21.88
@21.95# @21.93#
~I 2 e 2 d!0K 20.60 21.33
@21.42# @21.61#
~e 1 d!0MVE 21.26 26.47
@20.47# @21.60#
S 26.86 27.23 212.52 212.28
@23.60# @23.65# @23.81# @23.41#
OR2 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.17 0.19
N 67 67 67 69 67 67 67 69
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tax schedules are convex, extra risk also causes the expected benefit of debt
tax shields to fall. Given that the costs of leverage increase and the benefits
fall, higher risk and returns demand more equity, not less.
More formally, a link between OS and E @RA# does not change the compar-
ative statics for the equity share presented in Panel A of Table VI, but the
relationship between investment and E @RA# becomes indeterminate if OS is
negatively related to E @RA# ~and suboptimal leverage costs dominate infor-
mation costs!. This represents an efficient market explanation that predicts
both a negative relationship between the equity share and returns and no
relationship between investment and returns, just as observed in the data.
Though possible in theory, a negative relationship between OS and E @RA#
seems unlikely. The opposite is much more plausible, as in the risk example.
In any case, this explanation does offer a testable prediction: the equity
share’s predictive power should weaken or disappear after controlling for
leverage, and leverage itself should be strongly related to returns ~beyond
the MM effect!.16 Although we do not have data on optimal leverage, we do
have book leverage data—the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term
debt and book equity—from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of In-
come: Corporation Income Tax Returns. We analyze these data in Table VIII.
Whatever theory might connect the two, future returns and book leverage
are empirically unrelated. The coefficient in a regression of value-weighted
returns on lagged book leverage shown in column ~1! of Table VIII is not
significantly different from zero. The relationship is stronger for market
leverage, which uses the DJIA book-to-market ratio. In column ~2!, the co-
efficient has the predicted sign—higher leverage predicts higher future
returns—and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Note, how-
ever, that this correlation includes the mechanical MM effect described pre-
viously and also the book-to-market ratio effect introduced by our capitalization
method, in addition to any other impact.
Column ~3! of Table VIII shows that capital structure is not empirically
a mediator between the equity share and future returns. We regress value-
weighted returns on the lagged market leverage ratio and the equity share.
The statistical and economic significance of the equity share remains as
strong here as in regressions that do not control for leverage. Columns ~4!,
~5!, and ~6! show analogous results for equal-weighted returns. In these
regressions also, the significance of market leverage is driven by the book-
to-market capitalization effect.17 These results do not support the hypoth-
esis that an omitted factor is driving both capital structure changes and
returns.
16 Note that closed-end fund issues do not change the aggregate leverage structure. There-
fore the capital structure explanation considered here does not address why this component of
the equity share would predict equity returns.
17 Neither leverage nor the equity share predicts risk, measured as the standard deviation of
monthly stock returns over the subsequent year.
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D. Market Timing
In this section we test market efficiency more generally by checking whether
the equity share regression models forecast significantly negative returns.
This approach avoids the joint hypothesis problem noted by Fama ~1970!,
because the stock market must be a hedge against aggregate consumption
for a rational model to predict negative returns.18
Several previous authors have performed this type of test, including Fama
and Schwert ~1977!, Fama and French ~1988a!, and Kothari and Shanken
~1997!. Generally speaking, they do not find strong evidence against market
efficiency. For example, Fama and French ~1988a! look at whether the div-
idend yield predicts negative returns. Although sometimes negative, the fore-
cast is never significantly negative. Kothari and Shanken ~1997! find some
negative return forecasts using the book-to-market ratio, and a large nega-
tive return forecast for the equal-weighted market portfolio in 1930. For this
year, the hypothesis of a non-negative predicted return has a p-value of 0.02.
18 Merton ~1982, 1990! lists conditions under which the theoretical risk premium is positive.
Table VIII
New Issues Leverage and Equity Market Returns
OLS regressions of annual real equity market returns on leverage and the equity share in new
issues:
REt 5 a 1 b1~D0E !t21 1 b2 St21 1 ut
where RE denotes real percentage returns on the CRSP value-weighted ~VW! or equal-weighted
~EW! portfolio, D/E denotes the aggregate leverage ratio, and S denotes the equity share in
total new equity and debt issues. The sample includes returns from 1928 through 1996. Book
leverage is from Statistics of Income: Corporation Income Tax Returns, Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, and applies to the prior ~fiscal! year. Market leverage is equal to book leverage capitalized
at the prior-year book-to-market ratio of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Both independent
variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. t-statistics are shown in brack-
ets using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
VW CRSP EW CRSP
~1! ~2! ~3! ~4! ~5! ~6!
Intercept 8.56 8.56 8.63 13.98 13.98 14.08
@3.46# @3.55# @3.77# @3.64# @3.99# @4.31#
D0E ~book! 20.66 21.28
@20.27# @20.36#
D0E ~market! 4.67 3.46 13.06 11.07
@1.81# @1.71# @2.57# @2.72#
S 26.79 211.19
@23.73# @23.65#
OR2 20.01 0.04 0.14 20.01 0.16 0.27
N 69 69 69 69 69 69
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However, that calculation assumes that conditional on the estimate of the
slope, the intercept in the forecasting model is known, and thus the fore-
casting error comes from the slope alone. Kothari and Shanken report that
without this assumption, the p-value rises to 0.10 even for 1930. Finally,
Campbell and Shiller ~1998! note that the 1997 level of the dividend yield
implies negative returns in the future, but they do not state their level of
confidence.19
Our market return forecasts are presented in Table IX.20 In a simple uni-
variate model, the equity share predicts negative returns for six years: 1929,
1930, 1934, 1982, 1983, and 1984. ~In three of these years, 1929, 1930, and
1984, real returns actually were negative.! The first two columns show data
on the equity share in those six years. Columns ~3! and ~4! show the forecast
return and its standard error. Columns ~5! and ~6! test the hypothesis that
predicted returns never fall below the sample average real government bond
yield of 2.0 percent. This hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level for
1929, 1930, and 1984 equal-weighted and value-weighted returns and also
for 1934 equal-weighted returns. Columns ~7! and ~8! test the hypothesis
that predicted returns never fall below zero. This hypothesis is less theoret-
ically motivated than the hypothesis of a non-negative risk premium, but it
is also a lower hurdle for market efficiency to pass. Nevertheless, this hy-
pothesis is still rejected at the five percent level for 1929 and 1930 value-
weighted and equal-weighted returns and also for 1984 equal-weighted returns.
These results can be compared to Kothari and Shanken’s ~1997! finding that
B0M forecasts significantly negative returns for only one year, 1930, and
then at the 10 percent level.
The results are presented graphically in Figure 4. They apply to columns
~7! and ~8! of Table IX. The solid line shows predicted value-weighted re-
turns in Figure 4A for the observed range of the prior-year equity share.
Figure 4B shows predicted equal-weighted returns. The dashed lines contain
a 90 percent confidence interval for the predicted return. In the region where
the top dashed line falls below zero, we can reject non-negative returns at
the five percent level. Figure 4A shows this for 1929 and 1930, and Fig-
ure 4B shows this for 1929, 1930, and 1984. We also plot the actual returns.
Many of the actual returns fall outside of the 90 percent confidence interval.
Because the equity share explains only about 12 percent in the variation in
value-weighted returns, the confidence interval for individual returns is con-
siderably larger than the confidence interval for the mean return.
19 See Boudoukh, Richardson, and Smith ~1993! for an alternative approach to testing the
hypothesis of a nonnegative risk premium. They report evidence of a reliably negative risk
premium during periods of high expected inf lation and downward-sloping term structures.
20 In the tests in Table IX, we assume that the predicted return is normally distributed. The
predicted return will be asymptotically normal regardless of the distribution of returns, but it
will only be normal in a small sample if the returns themselves are normally distributed. For
value-weighted returns, we cannot reject the hypothesis of normality using a skewness-kurtosis
test. The equal-weighted returns, by contrast, have skewness and excess kurtosis. For this
reason, the equal-weighted results must be viewed as an approximation.
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To check for nonlinearity, we also estimate a predictive model that in-
cludes the equity share and its square. The squared term’s coefficient is not
significant, and including the squared term in the model does not change
the set of years for which it predicts significantly negative returns.
PANEL A. Predicted VW CRSP returns using the prior-year equity share.
PANEL B. Predicted EW CRSP returns using the prior-year equity share.
Figure 4. Predicted returns and the equity share. Figure 4A plots predicted one-year-
ahead real CRSP value-weighted returns using the prior-year equity share as a single predictor.
Figure 4B plots predicted one-year real CRSP equal-weighted returns. ~The year indicated is
the return year; the equity share is measured in the prior year.! The dashed lines represent a
90 percent confidence interval for the predicted value. Dots represented realized returns.
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These negative return predictions cast a more general doubt on market
efficiency and suggest that market timing drives our results. The story is
intuitive. When investor sentiment causes, for example, overvalued equity
prices, managers prefer to issue equity. Correlated investor sentiment im-
plies that other firms will be overvalued at the same time and will therefore
tend to make similar financing decisions. The final element is that arbitrage
forces slowly—but eventually with some success—push the market back down
to its efficient value.21 The upshot of these mechanics is that the equity
share in new issues predicts aggregate returns, as we observe. As a corol-
lary, to the extent that predictable variation in equity returns is driven mainly
by mispricing and not rational time variation, the level of investment need
not predict returns.
Consistent with managers timing a market periodically driven by irratio-
nal sentiment, the equity share in new issues is related to various measures
of investor optimism. Changes in the equity share are strongly positively
correlated with changes in aggregate insider sales of stock, negatively ~though
insignificantly! correlated with changes in the value-weighted closed-end fund
discount, and positively correlated with changes in consumers’ expectations
of business conditions.22 These correlations are consistent with previous find-
ings that insider trading profits ref lect timing ability and that closed-end
fund discounts and consumer sentiment capture investor sentiment.23
On the basis of this collection of evidence, we conclude that market timing
drives our results. Managers appear to time their issues to exploit not only
the idiosyncratic component of their firm’s returns but also the market
component.
Two final notes are worth making about this timing explanation. First, if
there is a distinction between new equity for investment and new equity for
pure speculation, it is not apparent in our aggregate data. We interact in-
vestment with the equity share to test the hypothesis that the predictability
of the equity share is primarily in periods of low investment. The coefficient
on this interaction term has the predicted positive sign but is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. Second, if firms’ issuance decisions ref lect their
views about equity valuations, they seem to be ignoring the dividend yield
and the book-to-market ratio. As mentioned previously, the correlation be-
21 Shleifer ~2000! reviews models of investor sentiment and limited arbitrage.
22 All correlations are measured using quarterly data. Using data on insider trading from
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser ~1999! over the period from 1976 through 1996, we find that the
correlation of changes in the equity share with changes in insider net sales is 0.36 ~ p , 0.01!.
Using closed-end fund data provided by Charles Lee and CDA Weisenberger over the period
from 1965 through 1996, we find that the correlation of changes in the equity share with
changes in the value-weighted closed-end fund discount calculated is 20.08 ~ p 5 0.39!. Finally,
changes in expectations of business conditions from 1978 through 1996, from the Index of
Consumer Sentiment, have a 0.19 ~ p 5 0.10! correlation with changes in the equity share.
23 Seyhun ~1992!, Lee ~1997!, and Jeng et al. ~1999! find that insiders earn abnormal profits.
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler ~1991! find that the number of IPOs increases when closed-end fund
discounts are low. Durell ~1999! finds that consumer sentiment is strongly correlated with
closed-end fund discounts.
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tween the equity share and the scaled-price variables is insignificant. This
suggests that even though the equity share does not appear to be linked to
rational variation in the discount rate, the dividend yield and book-to-
market ratio may be.
IV. Summary and Implications
The main result of this paper is that issuing firms tend to prefer equity
finance before periods of low returns and tend to shun equity, in favor of
debt, before periods of high returns. From a narrow statistical perspective,
one can make a good case that the equity share in new issues is stronger and
more robust than other known predictors of one-year-ahead market returns.
We do not find empirical support for any specific mechanism that could
link the equity share to subsequent returns even in an efficient market.
Instead, we believe this study offers some suggestive evidence that the stock
market as a whole may be inefficient and that managers exploit this inef-
ficiency with their financing decisions. In particular, the equity share some-
times predicts significantly negative returns on the market.
If this view is correct, and managerial timing of the market component of
returns is possible, then our results raise questions about how one should
view long-run event studies of managerial actions. As an example, Brav and
Gompers ~1997!, Brav et al. ~2000!, and Mitchell and Stafford ~2000! find
that some of the “new issues puzzle” results depend on the benchmark used.
They show that equity issuers do not perform worse than certain sets of
nonissuers in the first term of the decomposition Ri 5 ~Ri 2 Rb! 1 Rb. Mitch-
ell and Stafford and particularly Fama ~1998! point to this as evidence that
issuers’ low returns ref lect their risk characteristics.
Although one wonders how IPOs could ever plausibly be considered low
risk investments ~and therefore deserving low returns!, our results also raise
a methodological issue. Looking only at the excess return hides the fact that
both issuers and benchmark firms often simultaneously experience unusu-
ally low subsequent returns, as Brav and Gompers show in IPO data. If the
ability to time the market component of returns is a significant determinant
of managerial actions, as suggested by our results, long-run event studies
that ignore this consideration may be ignoring a big part of the story.
We suspect this benchmarking problem is relevant to other events where
a market timing motive is suspected, such as insider trading, repurchases,
and stock acquisitions, in addition to the new issues puzzle and financing
decisions. Researchers should be wary of this issue when interpreting long-
run event studies of managerial actions.
Appendix A. Alternative Definitions of the Equity Share
In the body of the paper we use the gross new equity and debt issues data
reported by the Federal Reserve Bulletin to compute the equity share. Here
we consider the impact of using other measures of equity and debt issuance.
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Table AI summarizes the results. In the first row we repeat, for reference,
the basic predictive ability of the unadjusted equity share for value-
weighted and equal-weighted market returns as in Table III.
In the first adjustment we consider, we subtract repurchases from the
gross new equity issues series. The repurchase data, from 1977 through
1996, combine annual observations from Bagwell and Shoven ~1989! with
more recent data from the Securities Data Company. Prior to 1977, we make
no adjustment. The resulting series has a correlation of 0.90 with the un-
adjusted series ~a correlation of 1.00 before 1977 and 0.86 after! and has
similar predictive power.24 The second adjustment subtracts convertibles and
junk debt from the gross debt issues series. These issues may bear more
resemblance to equity than straight debt. We gather convertible debt and
junk debt back to 1978 from the Securities Data Company. Prior to 1978, we
make no adjustment. The results are unaffected. The third adjustment sub-
tracts issues by utilities from both the equity and debt series. Issuance by
utilities may result from regulatory changes rather than market timing mo-
tives. We gather utilities issue data from the Federal Reserve Bulletin back
to 1961. Prior to 1961, we make no adjustment. This does not change the
basic results. The fourth adjustment combines the first three, again with
little change to the basic results.
We also consider the Federal Reserve Board’s f low of funds data. These
series measure net equity and net debt issues. One significant advantage,
relative to the unadjusted series, is that the f low of funds series net out
equity repurchases and debt retirements. Unfortunately, there are offsetting
disadvantages. The most severe is that variation in the series often comes
from the retirement of equity in mergers and acquisitions. The gross equity
issues series, by contrast, counts only equity issues for cash. As a result, the
gross series may better ref lect operations financing patterns. A second un-
fortunate limitation is that the f low of funds series begins in 1946.
Net equity issues are negative in 14 of the 51 years for which f low of funds
data are available. This can cause a practical problem. When the e in S 5
e0~e 1 d! is negative and large, it can yield an absurd value for the equity
share. For example, in 1989, net equity issues were 2$115.2 billion, and net
debt issues were $114.6 billion. Plugging these figures into the equity share
formula gives a value of 192! In an attempt to forge a meaningful equity
share series from the f low of funds data, we simply set the equity share to
zero in years where net equity issues are negative. This convention assumes
that years in which net equity issues are negative are likely to be years in
which equity was not the preferred vehicle for new finance. This truncation
also mitigates the effect of merger activity.
24 The Bagwell and Shoven series may suffer from some survivorship bias, as it does not use
the Compustat research files. We obtained similar results using the repurchase series reported
in Table II of Allen and Michaely ~1995!, which employs both the industrial and research files
to compute repurchases by the 1,000 largest firms in COMPUSTAT for each year between 1973
and 1991.
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The resulting 1946 to 1996 f low of funds equity share series has a corre-
lation of 0.65 with the unadjusted series. That is, net equity issues relative
to total net issues is highly correlated with gross issues relative to net gross
issues, our unadjusted equity share. Splicing the 1927 to 1945 unadjusted
equity share series to the 1946 to 1996 f low of funds net series naturally
results in a longer series with a slightly higher correlation with the full
unadjusted series, 0.75. And again, this series retains strong predictive power
for both EW and VW market returns.
Taken together, these exercises suggest that little predictive power is lost
by using the unadjusted measure of the equity share. Adjustments for con-
vertible debt, junk debt, repurchases, or issuance by utilities do not make
much practical difference, for better or worse. Similarly, the equity share
series constructed using f low of funds data yields a similar coefficient and
similar predictive power. Given these results, we prefer the unadjusted eq-
uity share series because of its transparency and historical consistency.
Appendix B. Mathematical Appendix
This appendix derives the empirical predictions presented in Table VI.
The manager’s objective function is
max
S, I
f ~I ! 2 ~1 1 E @RA# ! I 2 dSI 2 i ~SI ! 2 z~~S 2 OS! I ! ~B1!
where
f ’ . 0, f ’’ , 0,
i ’ , 0, i ’’ . 0 when S , 0 and i ’ . 0, i ’’ . 0 when S . 0,
z ’ , 0, z ’’ . 0 when S , OS and z ’ . 0, z ’’ . 0 when S . OS.
The manager chooses the equity share S ~the share of equity issues in total
equity and debt issues! and the level of total equity and debt issues I. The
setup is discussed in more detail in Section III.B and in Stein ~1996!.
The optimal equity share S and investment I satisfies the first order
conditions
f ’~I ! 1 z ’~~S 2 OS! I ! OS 5 ~1 1 E @RA# ! ~B2!
d 1 i ’~SI ! 1 z ’~~S 2 OS! I ! 5 0. ~B3!
These two equations allow us to calculate comparative statics: how the eq-
uity share S and the level of investment I respond to changes in the deter-
minants of equity returns, E @RA# and d.
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In this case, rational expected returns E @RA# may vary over time, but d is
always zero. To see what this implies for the relationship between the equity
share, investment, and future returns, we differentiate equations ~B2! and
~B3! with respect to E @RA# . This gives
f ’’~I !
dI
dE @RA#
1 z ’’~~S 2 OS! I ! OSSI dSdE @RA# 1 ~S 2 OS! dIdE @RA#D 5 1, ~B4!
and
i ’’~SI !SI dSdE @RA# 1 S dIdE @RA#D 1 z ’’~~S 2 OS! I !SI dSdE @RA# 1 ~S 2 OS! dIdE @RA#D 5 0.
~B5!
From the two equations, there are two comparative statics:
3
dI
dE @RA#
dS
dE @RA#
4 5 16A6 F i ’’I 1 z ’’I2i ’’S 2 z ’’~S 2 OS! G, ~B6!
where
A 5 F f ’’ 1 z ’’ OS~S 2 OS! z ’’ OSI
i ’’S 1 z ’’~S 2 OS! i ’’I 1 z ’’I
G ~B7!
Although these equations appear complicated, they are not difficult
to evaluate. First, because the determinant of A is negative and the
second derivatives of i and z are positive, investment is always nega-
tively related to future returns. Second, when there is no mispricing, it
is straightforward to show that the equity share falls between zero and
OS by equation ~B3!. As a consequence, the relationship between the
equity share and future returns depends on whether the information costs
i or the costs of deviating from optimal capital structure z are more im-
portant. When i dominates, the equity share is positively related to future
returns. When z dominates, the equity share is negatively related to future
returns.
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In this case, rational returns E @RA# are constant and d varies. To deter-
mine the empirical predictions of this setup, we differentiate equations ~B2!
and ~B3! with respect to d. This gives
f ’’~I !
dI
dd
1 z ’’~~S 2 OS! I ! OSSI dSdd 1 ~S 2 OS! dIddD 5 0 ~B8!
i ’’~SI !SI dSdd 1 S dIddD 1 z ’’~~S 2 OS! I !SI dSdd 1 ~S 2 OS! dIddD 5 21. ~B9!
From the two equations, there are two comparative statics:
3
dI
dd
dS
dd
4 5 16A6 F z ’’ OSI2~ f ’’ 1 z ’’ OS~S 2 OS!! G , ~B10!
where the matrix A is the same as in equation ~B7!.
Again, we evaluate the expressions. First, the relationship between invest-
ment and mispricing is negative. The determinant of A is negative, and the
second derivative of z is positive. However, the magnitude of this relation-
ship is proportional to the costs of deviating from optimal leverage z. At the
limit when information costs i dominate, investment is unrelated to mispric-
ing. Second, the relationship between equity issues and mispricing depends
on the parameters. When i dominates, the equity share is negatively related
to mispricing, because the second derivative of f is negative. When z domi-
nates, the relationship depends on the level of mispricing. If d is sufficiently
low, the level of equity issues will exceed the optimal capital structure OS. In
this case, it is possible ~although perhaps unlikely! for the level of equity
issues to move positively with mispricing. When d is higher, equity issues
are negatively related to future returns.
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